

THE BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF JAWARA ± IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY BANTEN

Abstrak

Sebagai salah satu elemen paling penting dalam masyarakat Banten yang sering diidentikkan sebagai masyarakat yang religius, kehadiran jawara—dan kiyai—dalam dinamika kehidupan sehari-hari yang meliputi aspek politik, sosial, ekonomi, dan budaya tidak bisa diabaikan begitu saja. Peran penting mereka tidak hanya terlihat dalam peranannya pada hampir semua perlawanan terhadap pemerintah kolonial Belanda, namun juga dalam kehidupan politik dan ekonomi pada masa kemerdekaan (Orde Lama dan Orde Baru).

Namun, hingga kini, kapan kemunculan jawara sebagai sebuah kelompok sosial masih menjadi pertanyaan besar. Penulis dalam artikel ini tidak memunculkan waktu yang tepat kapan munculnya jawara, namun penulis berusaha untuk menganalisis latar belakang kemunculan jawara yang diperkirakan tidak lebih lama dari awal abad kesembilan belas.

Kata Kunci: *Jawara, Banten, pemerintah kolonial Belanda*

Introduction

Banten is well-known for its long history of mysticism and rebellion, as well as the Islamic orientation of its society. Having inherited a tradition of great resistance to foreign powers, the long tradition of rebellion can be seen as dating back to the sixteenth century. Together with rebellion, Banten also has an established tradition of being centre for a variety of esoteric sciences. After Banten fell to the Dutch three forms of informal leadership emerged in Bantenese society. The first was the traditional aristocracy. The others were *ulama* and *jawara*. Of these three, the latter two still exist in society today. In fact, they became the most important elements in society, not only during the colonial period, but also after Indonesian independence (the Old Order and the New Order Era), right up to the present day.

Moreover, in order to understand the dynamics of modern Indonesian society, the study of certain social groups in certain periods cannot be neglected. Historical writing on the jawara at the local level is very urgent due to obvious reasons. Firstly, only few people among the historical subjects have already written about their experiences. Secondly, most of the historical subjects, older than seventy, have already passed away.

Therefore, the present study is concerned with the background to the emergence of jawara in Banten. The scope of the present study is the Banten region. This region consisted of three municipalities: Serang, Pandeglang and Lebak. To this end, one question needs to be clarified: what was the background of the emergence of jawara?

The Banten Area

Banten residency in the New Order Era consisted of three municipalities: Serang, Pandeglang, and Lebak. In general, Banten has two different geographical characteristics. The southern part is mainly upland and sparsely populated, while the northern part is more apt to be lowland and is highly populated. Most inhabitants in Banten are Sundanese, who reside in the southern part, while Javanese, who originally came from Demak and Cirebon, live mostly in the northern part. Kanekes or Baduy¹ people, who developed their own culture, live in the mountain area in the southern part.² In general, the inland region of Banten was more fertile. The north, especially the coastal region, where the hills gradually slope downwards, was characterised by poorly irrigated rice fields, a relatively high incidence of crop failure, and the almost complete absence of any crop other than rice.³ However, Kartodirdjo has a slightly different opinion. According to him, the most irrigable rice lands were to be found on the mountain slopes and the plains in the north and therefore the domains of the Sultan were to be found on the northern plain. Meanwhile, the mountainous and hilly regions in the south were regions where dry-rice cultivation was practised. Moreover, he pointed out that this region was dry and non-irrigable.⁴ Perhaps the best explanation why there is a difference between these two scholars concerning the fertility of Banten region lies in the changing appearance in Banten's rice fields over time. It is also interesting to note that according to Untoro there have been changes in the environment caused by the exploitation of clay for the making of earthenware vessels, for hundreds of years.⁵

Banten residency, as described earlier, was the Banten sultanate, before it fell under the command of the Dutch. The sultanate founded in

1525⁶ had wider territory. It covered Jasinga, Tangerang, and Lampung.⁷ During its heyday, the sultanate traded on an equal footing with foreigners, making treaties with the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch. Banten was a harbour, trade city and centre of administration all at once, it was a bustling kingdom. The rise of the trade in pepper and other commodities was in line with the development of Banten. The pepper trade was monopolized by the Sultan's family and by other rulers, thus a considerable number of noblemen cooperated with foreign merchants. The trade provided the main income of the sultanate. In addition, taxes from export goods and anchorage fees also gave a contributed significantly to the prosperity of Banten.⁸ However, after Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa passed away, its prestige sank down to a lower level, due to the power struggle among the sultans' family, which the Dutch used to enlarge their influence and intervene in the sultanate.⁹ The great sultanate finally came to an end in 1808 and the area was ruled by the Dutch.¹⁰

Nevertheless, after the Dutch inherited the former area of the sultanate, there were many rebellions against them. Four acts of resistance in the 1820s were the first ones. Rebellions seemed to have more followers when, in the 1830s, there were another four rebellions, followed by the Cikande uprising in 1845, the Wakhia resistance in 1850, and the peasants' revolt in 1888. In the twentieth century, the communist uprising happened in 1926. Many Muslims, including ulama, were involved. Consequently, those people who were involved in the uprising were exiled to Boven Digul, West Papua.¹¹ Kartodirdjo believed that the policies established by Daendels and Raffles after 1808 were the main factors behind the disturbances. Those policies inflicted a financial loss, and loss of power, to the sultan's relatives and the officials of the sultanate, and led to much discontent, which caused the disturbances.¹²

The Social Structure of Nineteenth Century Banten

If we look at the social structure of nineteenth century Banten, and the features of its agrarian background, we see that, in general, the villagers were peasants and rice cultivators, either as landowners or as share-croppers. However, it is interesting to note that a considerable number of villagers depended on trading, fishing, handicraft, or running an industry. To some extent, the majority of the people were farmers, while only a small number of the working population earned their livelihood by trade and handicrafts.¹³

Moreover, according to Kartodirdjo, the status system in Bantenese society can be seen in its stratification, namely *undakan*. There

is a popular opinion that Bantenese society is usually conceived of as presenting a bi-modal class division. The great majority of the people comprising peasants, craftsmen, traders, and labourers were called *djalma leutik*. The word *orang tani* was largely used for the social classification of people who made a livelihood by becoming tillers, craftsmen, and traders, while fishermen were not included. Meanwhile, a small upper class consisting of the bureaucratic elite and the nobility was called *priyayi*.¹⁴ This grouping is somewhat misleading since *orang tani* can also be considered *djalma leutik*. Both of them were in a lower class compared to *priyayi*. Therefore, the division consisted of *djalma leutik* or *orang tani*, and *priyayi*.

When the reign of Sultan Aliuddin¹⁵ ended, the throne went to Pangeran Muhiddin.¹⁶ The death of Sultan Aliuddin marked the beginning of a series of problems to do with the succession. Following his death, the successors could not enjoy a long period on the throne due to the dispute within the sultanate.¹⁷ To some extent, the problems perhaps can be best explained by the fact that the weak sultans could be easily influenced by the Dutch.¹⁸ After the East Indies were placed under the authority of Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels in 1808, he reorganized the administration on the orders of King Louis Napoleon, the ruler of the newly established Kingdom of Holland.¹⁹ Daendels created a centralistic government. All government affairs were arranged from Batavia. The colonial government based the administrative mechanism on a western model, placed sultans and their families under the Dutch colonial government, and converted them into bureaucrats. Daendels' purpose was to run the government under direct rule, so that he could rule the people without the local rulers as intermediary.²⁰ I argue that by converting them into bureaucrats, Daendels was convinced that they would become proponents of the new administrative policy, so that they would not become burdens, which would disrupt his rule. To a large extent, their position as bureaucrats was not equal to that of the local rulers' intermediary.

In Banten, throughout the nineteenth century, the most distinguished components of the civil service class consisted of members of the Banten nobility or at least people who had affinity through kinship with them. However, it is interesting to note that later the situation changed. Favoured commoners were promoted to the position of bureaucrat by the colonial government. The changing policy was mainly in reaction to the ineffectiveness, abuses, and corruption - or even sabotage - committed by the local elite. Commoners then became the

new modern bureaucratic elite and positioned themselves as the new aristocracy and thus became the core of the status group.²¹

Meanwhile, the social groups outside the ruling class had their own characteristics. They comprised the agriculturists, craftsmen, and traders (*djalma leutik* or *orang tani*); and fishermen, and men of religion (*kiyai* and *haji*). Furthermore, there were also the *abdi* (bondmen), who up to the end of the nineteenth century were still found serving their *gusti* (lord). Among the non-ruling class the members of the lower nobility may be put. The majority of them were rural inhabitants. In Banten, where communities were associated from a religious point of view, many of the traditions and customs had become identified with religion, with the result that the distinction between rural and urban culture was blurred.²²

Special attention must be paid to the two prominent groups of the peasantry, the village authorities and the religious leaders, who formed the rural elite. Kartodirdjo suggested that their social role, and its attendant status within the village, were clearly important. In the social movement, the religious leaders played an essential role, in which a special regard should be addressed to these leaders.²³

Kartodirdjo's depiction of the rural elite has obviously been important in providing background to the emergence of the jawara.²⁴ The village head was appointed by the sultan or by the appanage holder during the sultanate period, to whom land in the village was granted as *pecatan* (land granted to relative's officials, and personal favourites of the sultan). In a village there were often several *jaros* (village head)²⁵, each representing his master, who had gotten land there as *pecatan*. It is interesting to note that from the annexation of Banten up to 1844, the *jaros* seem to have been appointed by the government on the basis of suggestions made by the village elders, or by the *demang* (district head in Banten and Batavia in the nineteenth century); as from 1844, the *jaros* were elected by the people and the choice afterwards sanctioned by the government. The main function of the *jaro* was to act as a link between the local population and the broader administrative system. However, the *jaro* was regarded neither as a representative of the village inhabitants, nor as the real authority in their realm. In its search for the causes of resistance, the colonial government regarded the *jaro* as a weak link in the colonial administrative chain between the central government and the village. Furthermore, Kartodirdjo suggested that there were at least four social groups which cut across the village hierarchy. The first one is the *kolot-kolot* (the elders), who enjoyed authority over the villagers, because they performed a ceremonial function in the village

administration. The *panghulu* (head of mosque functionaries), or *amil* (village official in charge of collecting *zakat*), should be regarded as the second one. His power often surpassed that of the jaro. Last but not least, two more groups may be pointed out: the religious men and the jawara. The group of religious men (*kiyai* and *haji*) were of high rank and should be regarded as socially prestigious in Banten, where almost everyone was a Muslim. The last group—the jawara—shall be discussed later on in this chapter.²⁶ Why Kartodirdjo made a distinction between panghulu or amil and the religious men (*kiyai* and *haji*) can perhaps be explained by viewing them as two different social groups, with official and unofficial duties. While the former was usually appointed by the government and was co-opted by the ruler, the latter seemed to have more charismatic power, as they were admired by the local people for their grasp of Islamic knowledge; their position was independent compared to that of the former.

Religious Revival in Nineteenth Century Banten

I will now look more closely at the penetration of Islam in Banten. According to *Sajarah Banten*, Hasanuddin, the founder of the sultanate, converted to Islam 800 Hindu priests, whose leaders had disappeared at the foot of Gunung Pulosari. Indeed, this belief²⁷ spread and right after that became the important perception about the saintly Hasanuddin. The chronicle emphasised that Hasanuddin was an Islamic saint who also converted the local population from Hinduism to Islam.²⁸

Religious places, such as the Kasunyatan mosque,²⁹ played an important role in the religious life of people, and functioned as a means of demonstrating the sultan's wealth, power, and his devotion to Islam. Furthermore, Talens argues that Islam functioned as an ideological power, in the political system of the sultanate. The *Sharia* (Islamic law) was practised only in restricted territories, and only when it did not conflict with the interests of the court. Court rituals emphasised that the Sultan was the legitimate representative of God on earth.³⁰ Furthermore, some Dutch scholars, namely Snouck Hurgronje, de Graaf, Pigeaud, and Drewes, have suggested that the reputation of Banten as a Muslim region, in the nineteenth and the twentieth century, had its roots in traditions in the sultanate.³¹

As to the religious revival in nineteenth century Banten - Kartodirdjo examined it in depth, giving us a clear explanation of the religious background of many of the rebellions in Banten. According to him, the latter part of the nineteenth century was a period of religious revivalism, stimulating the movements in Banten. The increase of

religious activities was not only due to the fact that the people were pious adherents of Islam, but also due to the fact that there was disruption of traditional order and, concomitantly, enduring social unrest. In addition, on the one hand one encountered political deprivation, and on the other traditional reaffirmation. Therefore, the religious revival in Banten can be identified as a religious-political movement, which accommodated various social strains. However, the religious revival became a means of recruiting people for rebellion, rather than a purely religious movement. This was true, especially if we look more closely at the fact that in nineteenth century Banten the religious revival, and other kinds of social movements, had notable points of resemblance, particularly in their millennial appeals and lower-class base. Nevertheless, I argue that the rebellions can be regarded as religious movements, because religious institutions, such as *tarekat* (the Sufi brotherhood) and communities played some part in these movements. The possible triggers perhaps can be identified as the resentment against the Dutch domination and the powerful hostility towards foreigners which also found outlet in allegiance with extremist religious movements.³² If we take a look Java as a general example, we find out that for the Javanese their ruler was far more than a sacred king or defender of the Islamic faith. The Sultan was regarded as the sole link between man and the cosmos, and, as such, essential to the maintenance of harmony between the heavenly and terrestrial realms. Therefore, the Dutch who served as Governors-General of the Netherlands East Indies were hardly meaningful substitutes. They showed little inclination to promote Islam. In fact, the advance of Dutch power threatened a potential separation of religious and political, sacred and secular authority.³³

Kartodirdjo also argued that the religious revival also included a profound revitalization of religious life through both local and cosmopolitan Islamic institutions, and that the political counterparts of the Pan-Islamic movement could be seen in the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), and the *tarekat*. In the course of few decades, in Banten, there was an intensification of fanaticism in *pesantren* circles and a hostile and aggressive attitude came to be ingrained into the *santri* (pupils) towards both the foreigners and the *priyais*.³⁴

Furthermore, according to van Bruinessen, although Drewes identified that some time between 1527 and the end of the century, Karang, a "well-known *pesantren*" in Banten, had a reputation as the central figure of orthodox Islamic Islam, van Bruinessen suggested that the institution of the *pesantren* did not emerge before the eighteenth

century.³⁵ The pesantren in Banten drew santri from outside the village, who boarded with kiyai. Many pesantren were well-established and had built up reputations over the years, with leadership of the pesantren sometimes being passed on from a kiyai to the eldest son. To some extent, Williams argued that the kiyai had to be a leader of people whom the Dutch and later the Islamic modernist movement disliked, because he led them in a direction they considered narrow and conservative.³⁶

The Emergence of Jawara

Let us now discuss the jawara. While Kartodirdjo mentioned four groups which cut across the village hierarchy, Williams only pointed out three groups that dominated rural life in particular. They were the ulama, local notables, and the jawara. While Kartodirdjo believed that the jawara consisted of people without permanent occupation, often engaged in criminal activities, Williams and Atsushi had a more positive view of them. Williams stated that jawara were peasants, usually unattached young men, who led a semi-outlaw existence and whose influence and prestige were often far greater than the headmen's. In earlier times, the word jawara merely indicated a person with no fixed occupation. Gradually, it assumed other connotations. Atsushi sees jawara in almost the same way as Williams. According to him, jawara were not only local strongmen, whose influence and prestige were often far greater than those of the official headmen in remote areas of Banten throughout the colonial period, but furthermore, he also associated jawara with the phenomenon of the social bandit throughout the world, in the nineteenth and the twentieth century, and with *jago* (local strongmen in colonial Java). If we pay attention to the view of the Dutch, we will find out that Resident Craemer believed that jawara had a bad reputation, as has been described above. To some extent, the Dutch colonial view was as negative as that of Kartodirdjo.³⁷

The emergence of jawara was not a result of sheer oppression and grinding poverty in Banten. Though they may have joined in spontaneous food riots, or may have committed criminal acts, people facing starvation are too busy just surviving to plot the overthrow of government or to formulate a blueprint for an alternative social order.³⁸ The emergence of the jawara supports this proposition and the assertion that the potential for violent social protest corresponds to relative rather than absolute deprivation. Jawara groups who were considered to be bandits were reduced to starvation or to total impoverishment; they suffered a significant decline in their social standing and economic well-being.

Moreover, their relationship with the rural population was ambiguous, as can be seen in the ambiguity of the jawara figure in the folk etymology (which can also be considered to be an abbreviation) of the word: *jahat* (evil), *wani* (brave), *rampog* (robber) and *jago* (champion), *wani*, (brave), and *ramah* (friendly). Else Ensering classified jawara into two groups: the jawara-*teri*, in reference to petty thieves and robbers, and the jawara-*gedeh*, who practice pencak silat (martial arts), use weapons, and pursue mystical development under the guidance of a kiyai, culminating in obtaining invulnerability.³⁹

A considerable number of jawara started off as poor peasants who drifted back and forth between the countryside and the towns, or who had no land. Meanwhile, others were simply young men who depended on petty crime as an easier source of income than tilling the soil, or, in times of hardship, as a necessary addition to their income. They had an ambiguous relationship with the rural population; they were both feared and admired. Some exercised a virtual reign of terror in their regions, but others were seen as champions of peasant rights for their struggle against the Dutch and the priyayi. Because they were masters of the martial arts and because of their position in local society as marginal men, they were often at the forefront of rural protest.⁴⁰

For jawara, having supernatural power also meant having political and social power.⁴¹ From this perspective, jawara were people to fear and respect. Nevertheless, considering the distinction made between “black” and “white” jawara, it seems likely that the ambivalence was a survival strategy. Those who informed on or resisted the demands of jawara were dealt with harshly. With nowhere to turn, except perhaps to other jawara, villagers often had little choice but to acquiesce. Illegality has always been considered as part and parcel of jawara culture.⁴²

Speaking about the supernatural power jawara possessed, Tiharni suggested that jawara gained magic from kiyai to fulfil their practical needs. Magic was needed by both jawara and kiyai to legitimize their leadership. However, even though both of them possessed magic, there was a leadership attribute, namely *kawalat* (accursed and therefore struck down by calamity), in which jawara showed respect to kiyai, because if they stood against kiyai, they would lose their magic.⁴³

Moreover, not only jawara showed respect to kiyai as their teachers, but they were also often characterized by strict obedience to their leader. Together, the leader and the members formed a group united by inner ties, and possessing its own customs, ceremonies, code of honour, and even language. Usually dressed in black, the groups had a supernatural element in the individual leader's possession of magic. The

magic could consist of a word, an adage or an amulet, but sometimes was merely the conviction.⁴⁴

As a symbolic personality jawara embodied communal ties and the patron-client relationship upon which the largely rural society was based. Their influence extends into the present day and there continues to be a strong belief among the people in the invulnerability of jawara. In their rebellion against the authorities jawara were invulnerable to the coercive power of the Dutch colonial government and its agents. Distrusted and disliked by the Dutch and indigenous authorities alike, their support was still essential for establishing any lasting authority in Banten.⁴⁵

Conclusion

As one of the two most important elements in Bantenese society, the emergence of jawara is still questioned up to this day. However, the background that led to the emergence of jawara can be traced back to the early nineteenth century. The changing pattern of the local hierarchy due to the Dutch colonial government in Banten can be seen as the main factor in the emergence of the jawara. The attempt by the Dutch to create a centralistic government, and deny noblemen their previous position, which was considered higher in society, perhaps explains why there was so much resistance to the Dutch in Banten in the nineteenth century.

I argue that this resistance were the first stage of the emergence of jawara. Together with other elements, jawara fought against colonial authorities, as a result of a hostile and aggressive attitude towards both the foreigners and the priyayis. It is remarkable to see that even though jawara often were seen as a negative social group, their involvement in the religious movements marked their ambiguous relationship with the rural inhabitants by whom they were both feared and admired. []

Endnotes:

¹ For the position of Baduy people *vis-a-vis* the rest of the population of West Java, see Robert Wessing, "The Position of the Baduj in the Larger West Javanese Society", in *Man*, New Series, Vol. 12, No. 2 (August 1977), pp. 293-303.

² Kartodirdjo pointed out that the differences between North and South Banten should be ascribed partly to the differences in natural environment, an ecological factor, as well as to differences of a socio-cultural or historical nature. See Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 30. Generally speaking, these three ethnic groups have shown distinctions in language and custom. For instance, among the Dutch, the North Bantenese were notorious for their religious fanaticism, their aggressive attitude, and their rebellious

spirit. Meanwhile, paying attention to the distinction in language, Moriama Mikihiro argued that the self-awareness of being distinct in terms of language, culture, and ethnicity did not exist in West Java before the nineteenth century. It was colonial administrators and scholars who forced the people of West Java to objectify themselves in opposition to the Javanese and the Malay, cited in Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

³ Michael C. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 2-4. Williams even suggested that Pandeglang in the South was the most fertile region in Banten.

⁴ See Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Furthermore, he stated that economic factors favoured the North, which comprised the main granaries and was located to trade routes and centres.

⁵ See Untoro, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁶ Kartodirdjo stated it was established in 1520. See Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 53, while Atsushi carefully mentioned that it was established between 1522 and 1527. See Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁷ Atsushi argued that Banten's control over Lampung occurred in the sixteenth century. See *ibid.*, p. 16.

⁸ M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1600* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 76 and 392.

⁹ The events of 1682 where the Dutch sent troops to Banten in March 1682 have long been considered very crucial in the history of Banten, due to the sultanate's lost of its diplomatic independence and its basis of economic prosperity. See Atsushi *op. cit.*, p. 18 and Suharto, *Banten dalam Masa Revolusi 1945-1949: Proses Integrasi dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*. Ph.D. Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2001, p. 5.

¹⁰ However, Williams argued that although the sultanate was annexed by the Dutch in 1808, they retained the sultan as nominal ruler until 1832. See Williams, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹² Those policies were the abolishment of the royal domains and the compulsory labour attached to it, and the introduction of the levying of one-fifth of the yield as land taxation for the whole area of the lowlands of Banten, introduced by Daendels, and the creation of the land rent, the sole land taxation by Raffles. See Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-37.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁵ Sultan Aliuddin or Sultan Abul Mohammad Ali Uddin or Sultan Ali Uddin I or Sultan Gomok, (r. 1777-1802) was the son of Sultan Abul Nazar Mohammad Arif Zainul Asikin (r. 1753-1777). See Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 225. However, Lubis dates the reign of Sultan Aliuddin differently. According to her, his reign was from 1773-1799. See Lubis, *op. cit.*, p. 87. Since Lubis did not reveal her source, while Atsushi used the *Sajarah Banten* text G (Pudjiastuti, *Sajarah Banten*); *Overgekomen brieven en papieren*, the Nationaal Archief, The Hague; *Mackenzie Collection, Miscellaneous*, the British Library, London, I feel that we should accept Atsushi's opinion.

¹⁶ Pangeran Muhiddin, or Sultan Abul Fatah Mohammad Mochiddin Zainul Salihin, or Sultan Salihin I (r. 1802-1804) was the son of Sultan Abul Nazar Mohammad Arif Zainul Asikin and the younger brother of Sultan Aliuddin. See Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 225. Again, Lubis suggested differently (1799-1801). See Lubis, *op. cit.*, p. 87. The same explanation as in footnote 29 can be applied to this difference.

¹⁷ According to Atsushi, after Sultan Aliuddin died, there were four kings who reigned in 14 years from the period of 1802-1816. See Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143 and Lubis *op. cit.*, p. 88.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89, and Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁴ Michael C. Williams and Ota Atsushi have suggested that scholars who deal with the early nineteenth century Banten, especially the socio-economic and socio-political situation in that period, should consult Kartodirdjo's work. Therefore, to some extent, I am stimulated by these scholars in presenting the background for this chapter. See, Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 3 and Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁵ In Colonial Java, the Dutch created new villages and gave the headmen power over villagers they previously did not have. Moreover, the Dutch named the village headmen 'lurah', a sacred position derived from the *wayang* tradition in Javanese popular culture. For Onghokham, the title of village headmen in pre-colonial Java seems not to have been lurah but *bekel demang* or *petinggi patuh*; they functioned chiefly as tax-collectors and organizers of labour. See Onghokham, 'the Jago in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of the People', in Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe (Ed.), *History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia* (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984), p. 335.

²⁶ Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-58. To see power relations in Banten between 1750 and 1830, see Atsushi, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 40-51.

²⁷ In many regions in Indonesia, there is a general belief that people who have mystical power can disappear for certain purposes. The same perception can also be addressed to saintly people in *Sajarah Banten*.

²⁸ Titik Pudjiastuti, *Sadjarah Banten: Suntingan Teks dan Terjemahan Disertai Tinjauan Aksara dan Amanat*. Ph.D. Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, pp. 326-333.

²⁹ Name of a mosque in Banten Lama, the domain of the Sultans.

³⁰ Johan Talens. *Een feodale samenleving in koloniaal vaarwater: Staatvorming, koloniale expansie en economische onderontwikkeling in Banten, West-Java 1600-1750*. Hilversum: Verloren, 1999, pp.134-148, 174-175, cited in Atsushi, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³¹ C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Ambtelijke adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje 1889-1936*, edited by Emile Gobeë and Cornelis Adriaanse (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957-1965), II, 1246-1247; H.J. de Graaf and Th.G.Th. Pigeaud, *De eerste moslimse vorstendommen op Java: studien over de staatkundige geschiedenis van de 15de en 16de eeuw* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 117-122; G.W.J. Drewes (ed.), *The Admonitions of She Bari* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 11-12, cited in Atsushi, *ibid.*, p. 34.

³² Kartodirdjo *op. cit.*, p. 140-141.

³³ Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: a Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), especially pp. 2-4, 26-28, 33-37, and 83-84.

³⁴ Kartodirdjo, *op. cit.*, p. 154-157.

³⁵ Martin van Bruinessen, 'Pesantren and Kitab Kuning: Maintenance and Continuation of a Tradition of Religious Learning', in Wolfgang Marschall (ed.), *Texts from the Islands: Oral and Written Traditions of Indonesia and the Malay World* (Ethnologica Bernica, 4) (Berne: University of Berne, 1994), pp. 136-138.

- ³⁶ Williams, *op, cit*, p. 57-58.
- ³⁷ Kartodirdjo, *op, cit*, pp. 57-58; Atsushi, *op, cit*, p. 154; Williams, *op, cit*, p. 45; Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, *op, cit*, p. XXIII; Lubis, *op, cit*, p. 128.
- ³⁸ Eric Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), p. 79.
- ³⁹ Else Ensering, *op, cit*, pp. 131-161.
- ⁴⁰ Williams, *op, cit*, p. 46. If we want to compare the emergence of jawara with jago, we should consult Onghokham. He suggested that power brokers arose between the rulers and the ruled and the general term for these power brokers was jago (a term which may be rendered as champion or 'cock of the roost'). Even though he pointed out the jago in colonial Java, their historical roots lie in the pre-colonial period, during the time of royal wars and in a period of violence in Javanese history. See Onghokham, *op, cit*, p. 336.
- ⁴¹ Meanwhile, in traditional Java the crucial part played by supposed supernatural qualities can be seen in the legitimizing of power. For king and priyayi, supernatural concepts revolved around the king's *wahyu* (divine revelation) and *cahya* (light). The peasantry on the other hand thought of their jago as being *kebal* (invulnerable) against sharp weapons, bullets, and also against the anger of those possessing authority. *Ibid*, p. 336.
- ⁴² Wilson, *op, cit*, p. 245. In addition, Atu Karomah, who conducted field research into jawara and the violence culture in Bantenese society, suggested that in present-day jawara there are at least four motives for jawara to perform violence actions. They are: to defend their honour, to revenge the death of a family member, to protect their wife, and being defeated in a local village head's election. See Atu Karomah, *op, cit*, pp. 63-97.
- ⁴³ This institution was examined by Tihami, *op, cit*, pp. 21. Furthermore, he stated that this institution dealt with the obedience of jawara to kiyai as a realization of teachers-students relation, in which kiyai were the teachers.
- ⁴⁴ Williams, *op, cit*, p. 48.
- ⁴⁵ Wilson, *op, cit*, p. 253.

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